Asymmetric social norms

Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Camera, Gabriele ; Gioffré, Alessandro
Publisher:	Frankfurt a. M. : Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
Subject:	cooperation \| repeated games \| social dilemmas

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Series:	SAFE Working Paper ; 162
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2897466 [DOI] 877360685 [GVK] hdl:10419/149240 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:safewp:162 [RePEc]
Classification:	C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584815