Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection
Year of publication: |
September 2017
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Authors: | Barron, Daniel |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 12.2017, 3, p. 957-978
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Subject: | Repeated Bayesian games | efficiency | Theorie | Theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Markov-Kette | Markov chain | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Effizienz | Efficiency | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency |
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