Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Agastya, Murali ; Feng, Xin ; Lu, Jingfeng |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 107.2023, p. 1-11
|
Subject: | Exclusive bidding | Covert information acquisition | Endogenous market size | Optimal auctions | Revenue maximization | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Auktion | Auction | Marktgröße | Market size |
-
Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? : an experimental investigation
Cabrales, Antonio, (2018)
-
Information Acquisition During a Dutch Auction
Miettinen, Paavo, (2010)
-
Revenue guarantees in auctions with a (correlated) common prior and additional information
Yamashita, Takuro, (2018)
- More ...
-
Auction Design with Shortlisting When Value Discovery is Covert
Agastya, Murali, (2022)
-
EX ANTE EFFICIENT MECHANISM WITH PRIVATE ENTRY COSTS
Feng, Xin, (2020)
-
Optimal Prize Design in Team Contests
Feng, Xin, (2021)
- More ...