Auctions with a random number of identical bidders

We examine and compare the (normally, mixed) symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies in first-price and all-pay common value multiple item auctions with a random number of bidders, who only seek one of the identical items and have the same budget.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Haviv, Moshe ; Milchtaich, Igal
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 114.2012, 2, p. 143-146
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Auctions \| Stochastic number of bidders \| Random-player games \| Identical bidders \| Symmetric equilibrium

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D4 - Market Structure and Pricing
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572235