Audit policies under the sentinel effect : deterrence-driven algorithms
| Year of publication: |
2019
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Bouayad, Lina ; Padmanabhan, Balaji ; Chari, Kaushal |
| Published in: |
Information systems research : ISR. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 1047-7047, ZDB-ID 1081934-4. - Vol. 30.2019, 2, p. 466-485
|
| Subject: | audit | deterrence | medical fraud | network diffusion | game theory | agent-based simulation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Agentenbasierte Modellierung | Agent-based modeling | Simulation | Betrug | Fraud | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Algorithmus | Algorithm | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
-
Spoofing the limit order book : a strategic agent-based analysis
Wang, Xintong, (2021)
-
Collusion by mistake : does algorithmic sophistication drive supra-competitive profits?
Abada, Ibrahim, (2024)
-
Preventing fraudulent financial reporting with reputational signals of strategic auditors
Sealy, Chezham L., (2025)
- More ...
-
Deterrence-Driven Algorithms for Audit Under the Sentinel Effect
Bouayad, Lina, (2017)
-
Bouayad, Lina, (2020)
-
Design of private backbone networks -- II: time varying grouped traffic
Chari, Kaushal, (1993)
- More ...