Auditing, disclosure, and verification in decentralized decision problems
Year of publication: |
November 2016
|
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Authors: | Anderlini, Luca ; Gerardi, Dino ; Lagunoff, Roger D. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 131.2016, 1, p. 393-408
|
Subject: | Auditing | Disclosure | Agency bias | Ideological bias | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Systematischer Fehler | Bias |
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