Autocratic mechanisms : a form of dictatorship in constrained combinatorial auctions
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lerner, Anat ; Gonen, Rica |
Published in: |
International game theory review. - [River Edge], NJ [u.a.] : World Scientific, ISSN 0219-1989, ZDB-ID 1500913-0. - Vol. 17.2015, 4, p. 1-25
|
Subject: | Budget constraints | dictatorship | Pareto optimality | incentive compatibility | Diktatur | Dictatorship | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Budgetrestriktion | Budget constraint | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Anreiz | Incentives | Autoritarismus | Authoritarianism |
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