Az ellenzék ereje: Általános súlyozott szavazási játékok

The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted voting games, where the value of a coalition is a random variable. We illustrate the use of this model on examples from Hungary.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Kóczy, László Á. ; Pintér, Péter Miklós
Publisher:	Budapest : Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Wahlverhalten \| Koalition \| Shapley-Wert \| Ungarn \| weighted voting \| Hungarian National Assembly \| absent voters \| Shapley-Shubik index

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Series:	IEHAS Discussion Papers ; MT-DP - 2010/25
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	Hungarian
ISBN:	978-615-5024-16-0
Other identifiers:	638195772 [GVK] hdl:10419/108202 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494447