Banks, Maturity Mismatches and Liquidity Crises: A Simple Model

In determining the maturity structure of bank loans in the presence of pre-determined short-term international liabilities, we show that maturity mismatches in banks’ balance sheets are fully consistent with the assumption of banks acting as self-interested, optimising agents. Although often attributed to the moral hazard associated with safety nets, the analysis shows that financial crises can occur in their absence.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Rajan, Ramkishen S. ; Bird, Graham
Published in:	Economia Internazionale / International Economics. - Camera di Commercio di Genova. - Vol. 56.2003, 2, p. 185-192
Publisher:	Camera di Commercio di Genova
Subject:	Banks \| currency crisis \| East Asia \| maturity mismatches \| moral hazard

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems ; F39 - International Finance. Other ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008512537