Bargaining among Groups: An Axiomatic Viewpoint

We introduce a model of bargaining among groups, and characterize a family of solutions using a Consistency axiom and a few other invariance and monotonicity properties. For each solution in the family, there exists some constant alpha >= 0 such that the "bargaining power" of a group is proportional to calpha where c is the cardinality of the group.

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Year of publication:	2004-01
Authors:	Chae, Suchan ; Moulin, Herve
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Rice University

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Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005002305