Bargaining Over New Ideas: The Distribution of Rents and the Stability of Innovative Firms
We develop a theory of the rent distribution and stability of innovative firms. Our theory is based on a model of bargaining over new ideas. The model accounts for the problem of information leakage, namely, the diffusion of information about new ideas among the agents that participate in the bargaining. Our main results draw a link between the strength of intellectual property rights enforcement and the distribution of rents in firms as well as between the size and organization of firms and their stability. Our theory explains why small firms are advantaged in introducing innovation into the market and why spin-outs tend to emerge from large established firms. (JEL: L1, L2, C7) (c) 2007 by the European Economic Association.
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Baccara, Mariagiovanna ; Razin, Ronny |
Published in: |
Journal of the European Economic Association. - MIT Press. - Vol. 5.2007, 6, p. 1095-1129
|
Publisher: |
MIT Press |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Bargaining over new ideas : the distribution of rent and the stability of innovative firms
Baccara, Mariagiovanna, (2007)
-
Innovation and corporate conservatism
Baccara, Mariagiovanna, (2009)
-
Bargaining over new ideas : rent distribution and stability of innovative firms
Baccara, Mariagiovanna, (2006)
- More ...