Bargaining versus efficiency wages in a dynamic labor market : a synthesis

by Jon Strand (Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway)

We construct a model integrating the efficiency wage model of Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) with the matching-bargaining models of Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides (DMP). Firms and workers form pairwise matches, workers may shirk on the job, and the wage is set in an asymmetric Nash bargain over the surplus created by nonshirking. The wage is then always higher, and employment lower, than in both the corresponding Shapiro=Stiglitz and DMP models.

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Year of publication:	August 1998
Authors:	Strand, Jon
Publisher:	Oslo, Norway : Department of Economics, University of Oslo
Subject:	bargaining \| efficiency \| wages \| labour market \| Effizienzlohn \| Efficiency wages \| Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes \| Collective bargaining theory \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten)
Series:	Memorandum / Department of Economics, University of Oslo. - Oslo : Department of Economics, University of Oslo, ISSN 0809-8786, ZDB-ID 2532549-8. - Vol. 1998/22
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
ISBN:	82-570-9184-7
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/90789 [Handle]
Classification:	J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011518445