Bargaining with Deadlines
We study a dynamic model of pre-trial negotiations in which a privately-informed defendant bargains over a possible settlement offer with a plaintiff. We characterize the unique equlibrium limit of a sequence of games as the plaintiff can make more and more frequent offers and discuss under what conditions one can expect a deadline effect - i.e. a positive probability mass of agreement right before the deadline. We discuss connections to the generalized Coase Conjecture.
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Fuchs, William |
Institutions: | Society for Economic Dynamics - SED |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders
Skrzypacz, Andrzej, (2007)
-
Adverse Selection, Slow Moving Capital and Misallocation
Papanikolaou, Dimitris, (2014)
-
From Equals to Despots: The Dynamics of Repeated Group Decision Taking with Private Information
Fuchs, William, (2009)
- More ...