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Bargaining with many players: A limit result

We provide a simple characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternating offers bargaining game when the number of players increases without a limit. Core convergence literature is emulated by increasing the number of players by replication. The limit allocation is interpreted in terms of Walrasian market for being the first proposer.
Year of publication:
2008
Authors: Kultti, Klaus ; Vartiainen, Hannu
Published in:
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 101.2008, 3, p. 249-252
Publisher: Elsevier
Keywords: Non-cooperative bargaining Stationary equilibrium Replication Walrasian market
Type of publication: Article
Source:
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005158961
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