Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study

We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation. We modify the standard Nash demand game so that incompatible demands do not necessarily lead to the disagreement outcome. Rather, with exogenous probability q, one bargainer receives his/her demand, with the other getting the remainder. We use an asymmetric bargaining set (favouring one bargainer) and disagreement payoffs of zero, and we vary q over several values.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Anbarci, Nejat ; Feltovich, Nick
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 76.2012, 2, p. 495-514
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Nash demand game \| Random implementation \| Chilling effect \| Equilibrium selection \| Arbitration \| Experiment

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010588271