BAYESIAN BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL AGENTS PLAY THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA.
Year of publication: |
1988
|
---|---|
Authors: | VEGA, F. |
Institutions: | Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
Subject: | decision making | game theory | economic models |
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