Bayesian consistent belief selection
A subjective expected utility agent is given information about the state of the world in the form of a set of possible priors. She is assumed to form her beliefs given this information. A set of priors may be updated according to Bayes' rule, prior-by-prior, upon learning that some state of the world has not obtained. In a model in which information is completely summarized by this set of priors, we show that there exists no decision maker who obeys Bayes' rule, conditions her prior only on the available information (by selecting a belief in the announced set), and who updates the information prior-by-prior using Bayes' rule.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Chambers, Christopher P. ; Hayashi, Takashi |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 145.2010, 1, p. 432-439
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
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