Becoming the neighbor bidder : endogenous winner's curse in dynamic mechanisms

Alejandro Francetich

Year of publication:	[2014] ; This version: March, 2014
Authors:	Francetich, Alejandro
Publisher:	Milano, Italy : IGIER, Università Bocconi
Subject:	Dynamic mechanism design \| sequential auctions \| interdependent values \| multi-dimensional types \| winner’s curse \| double sourcing \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Auktion \| Auction

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