Behavioral biases in endogenous-timing herding games: An experimental study

We experimentally study behavior in an endogenous-timing herding game. We find that subjects respond to their type and to observed investment activity in a sensible way, but there are also substantial departures from Nash Equilibrium. Some departures can be viewed as mere noise in decision making while other departures represent systematic biases reflecting subjects’ failure to appreciate subtle aspects of the game.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Ivanov, Asen ; Levin, Dan ; Peck, James
Published in:	Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 87.2013, C, p. 25-34
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Endogenous-timing herding game \| Biases \| Experiment

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010636219