Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Fehr, Ernst ; Powell, Michael ; Wilkening, Tom |
Publisher: |
Zurich : University of Zurich, Department of Economics |
Subject: | Implementation Theory | Incomplete Contracts | Experiments |
Series: | Working Paper ; 171 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.5167/uzh-98147 [DOI] 1741700965 [GVK] hdl:10419/227459 [Handle] |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior |
Source: |
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst, (2014)
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst, (2014)
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Aghion, Philippe, (2015)
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Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms
Fehr, Ernst, (2021)
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst, (2014)
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst, (2014)
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