Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fehr, Ernst ; Powell, Michael ; Wilkening, Tom |
Published in: |
American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : AEA, ISSN 1944-7981, ZDB-ID 2009979-4. - Vol. 111.2021, 4, p. 1055-1091
|
Subject: | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Einführung | Implementation | Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit | Arbitration | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics | Experiment | 2009 | 2017-2018 |
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