Behavioral identification in coalitional bargaining : an experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fréchette, Guillaume R. ; Kagel, John H. ; Morelli, Massimo |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 73.2005, 6, p. 1893-1937
|
Subject: | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making | Entscheidungstheorie | Decision theory | Koalition | Coalition | Experiment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
-
Perverse committee appointments may foster divide and rule
Seidmann, Daniel J., (2008)
-
Coalition formation and social choice
Deemen, Adrian M. A. van, (1997)
-
The network of weighted majority rules and weighted majority games
Karotkin, Drora, (1998)
- More ...
-
Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
Fréchette, Guillaume R., (2005)
-
Fréchette, Guillaume R., (2012)
-
Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining
Fréchette, Guillaume R., (2005)
- More ...