Bertrand Vs. Cournot: An Evolutionary Approach

In this paper we study an oligopoly game with a differentiated product using a dynamic evolutionary approach. Firms are allowed to choose between quantity setting and price setting behavior. We find that, under both classical interaction structures, namely 'random mating' and 'paying the field'. Quantity setting behavior (i.e., 'Cournot' behavior), is selected as an asymptotically stable state for the dynamics.

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Year of publication:	1992
Authors:	Sacco, Pier Luigi ; Scarpa, Carlo
Publisher:	Bologna : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

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Series:	Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; 138
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5222 [DOI] hdl:10419/158981 [Handle] RePEc:bol:bodewp:138 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011651007