Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Correa, Alvaro Name ; Yildirim, Huseyin |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 127.2021, p. 1-27
|
Subject: | Bias | Committee composition | Majority rule | Partisanship | Theorie | Theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Entscheidung | Decision | Experten | Experts | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Systematischer Fehler |
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