Biased managers as strategic commitment in a mixed duopoly with relative profit-maximizers
Year of publication: |
December 2015
|
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Authors: | Nakamura, Yasuhiko |
Published in: |
Journal of industry, competition and trade. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 1566-1679, ZDB-ID 2067120-9. - Vol. 15.2015, 4, p. 323-336
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Subject: | Strategic delegation | Biased expectations | Aggressiveness | Quantity competition | Duopol | Duopoly | Preiswettbewerb | Price competition | Führungskräfte | Managers | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Strategisches Management | Strategic management | Wettbewerb | Competition | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Öffentliches Unternehmen | Public enterprise |
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