Biased performance evaluation in a model of career concerns : incentive versus ex-post efficiency
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Stepanov, Sergey |
Publisher: |
Moscow : Higher School of Economics Publ. House |
Subject: | Erwerbsverlauf | Occupational attainment | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Führungskräfte | Managers |
-
Wan, Hualin, (2015)
-
Director's monitoring effectiveness and CEO compensation
Hooy, Chee Wooi, (2014)
-
Turedi, Serdar, (2020)
- More ...
-
Shareholder access to manager-biased courts and the monitoring/litigation trade-off
Stepanov, Sergey, (2010)
-
Firm Value in Crisis: Effects of Firm-Level Transparency and Country-Level Institutions
Enikolopov, Ruben, (2012)
-
Shareholder Protection and Outside Blockholders: Substitutes or Complements?
Stepanov, Sergey, (2013)
- More ...