Bidding for Brains : Intellectual Property Rights and the International Migration of Knowledge Workers

We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the 'poaching' of their 'brains' by larger, wealthier markets

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	McAusland, Carol
Other Persons:	Kuhn, Peter Joseph (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Immaterialgüterrechte \| Intellectual property rights \| Theorie \| Theory \| Brain Drain \| Brain drain \| Arbeitsmigranten \| Migrant workers \| Qualifikation \| Occupational qualification \| Arbeitsnachfrage \| Labor demand \| Wettbewerb \| Competition