Bounding the benefits of stochastic auditing : the case of risk-neutral agents
Year of publication: |
1999
|
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Authors: | Snyder, Christopher M. |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 14.1999, 1, p. 247-253
|
Subject: | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Risikoneutralität | Risk neutrality |
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