Bundling, Entry Deterrence, and Specialist Innovators
We examine a mechanism by which bundling may inefficiently deter entry into the market. The model considers an incumbent monopolist in two complementary components that faces a series of entry attempts by rivals. It is shown that the incumbent can practice bundling to buttress its monopoly position by keeping specialist innovators out of the market. Bundling prevents specialist rivals from coordinating in the dynamic entry process, reducing the probability of an eventual displacement of the incumbent. The specialization decisions of rivals are also distorted. Bundling may lead to lower customer and total economic welfare.
Year of publication: |
2006
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Authors: | Choi, Jay Pil ; Stefanadis, Christodoulos |
Published in: |
The Journal of Business. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 79.2006, 5, p. 2575-2594
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Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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