Calibrated click-through auctions : an information design approach

by Dirk Bergemann, Paul Duetting, Renato Paes Leme, and Song Zuo

Year of publication:	2021
Authors:	Bergemann, Dirk ; Duetting, Paul ; Paes Leme, Renato ; Zuo, Song
Publisher:	New Haven, Connecticut : Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Subject:	Click-Through Rates \| Information Design \| Second-Price Auction \| Calibration \| Private Signals \| Public Signals \| Conflation \| Signalling \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Auktion \| Auction \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information

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