Can affirmative action policies be inefficiently persistent?
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Jehiel, Philippe ; Leduc, Mathieu V. |
Subject: | Affirmative action | Game theory | General equilibrium | Loss aversion | Moral hazard | Prospect theory | Tragedy of the commons | Spieltheorie | Prospect Theory | Moral Hazard | Allgemeines Gleichgewicht | Arbeitsmarktdiskriminierung | Labour market discrimination | Gemeingüter | Commons | Antidiskriminierungsrecht | Anti-discrimination law | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion |
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