Can simple regulatory mechanisms realistically be used for electricity transmission investment? : the case of H-R-G-V
Year of publication: |
March 2018
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Authors: | Vogelsang, Ingo |
Published in: |
Economics of energy & environmental policy. - Cleveland, Ohio : Sheridan Press, ISSN 2160-5882, ZDB-ID 2650750-X. - Vol. 7.2018, 1, p. 63-87
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Subject: | Transmission investment | regulatory mechanism | congestion relief | central planning | stakeholder bargaining | Theorie | Theory | Investition | Investment | Elektrizitätsversorgung | Electricity supply | Regulierung | Regulation | Elektrizitätswirtschaft | Electric power industry | Netzregulierung | Access regulation | Elektrizitätspolitik | Electricity policy | Stakeholder |
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