Candidate stable voting rules for separable orderings

We consider the election model in which voters choose a subset from the set of candidates. Both voters and candidates are assumed to possess preferences with separable strict orderings. We investigate a rule satisfying candidate stability, which is the requirement to deter any candidate from strategic withdrawal. We show that a rule satisfies candidate stability if and only if it satisfies independence of the selection for each candidate.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Hatsumi, Kentaro
Publisher:	Osaka : Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Subject:	multiple-winner election \| strategic candidacy \| separable preference \| voting by committees

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Series:	ISER Discussion Paper ; 735
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	616979843 [GVK] hdl:10419/92870 [Handle]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332485