Capacity precommitment and price competition yield Cournot outcomes
We study an industry of a homogeneous good where n firms with identical technology compete by first building capacity, and then, after observing the capacity decisions, choosing a “reservation price” at which they are willing to sell their entire capacities. We show that every pure strategy equilibrium yields the Cournot outcome, and that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium.
Year of publication: |
2001-01
|
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Authors: | Moreno, Diego ; Úbeda, Luis |
Institutions: | Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid |
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