Capital Taxation and Electoral Accountability

This paper investigates the role of performance voting in solving the capital levy problem. In a representative democracy, voters can use elections to protect their property by holding politicians accountable for the tax policies they implement. We characterize the set of tax policies that can be sustained by symmetric performance standards and show when this set contains the second best (Ramsey) tax policy.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Aidt, Toke ; Magris, Francesco
Institutions:	Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Évry Val d'Essonne
Subject:	Performance voting \| capital taxation \| time consistency

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Documents de recherche.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 04-18 31 pages
Classification:	H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939369