Career-risk concerns, information effort, and optimal pay-for-performance sensitivity
Qi Chen, Shane S. Dikolli (Duke University), Wei Jiang (Columbia University)
| Year of publication: |
2015
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Chen, Qi ; Dikolli, Shane S. ; Jiang, Wei |
| Published in: |
Journal of management accounting research : JMAR. - Sarasota, Fla. : Assoc., ISSN 1049-2127, ZDB-ID 1101530-5. - Vol. 27.2015, 2, p. 165-195
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| Subject: | career concerns | pay-for-performance | information effort | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation | Theorie | Theory | Erwerbsverlauf | Occupational attainment | Führungskräfte | Managers | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.2308/jmar-51165 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011483436