Casting the naturalization of asylum seekers as an economic problem

The asylum seekers who choose the level of investment in the host-country-specific human capital, and the government of the host country that chooses the probability of naturalization are modeled as optimizing economic agents in a setting not of their choosing.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Stark, Oded
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	The probability of naturalization \| Investment in host-country-specific human capital \| Economic behavior of asylum seekers \| Economic behavior of the government of the host country \| Stackelberg game

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Economics Letters 3.108(2010): pp. 286-290
Classification:	F20 - International Factor Movements and International Business. General ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values ; J61 - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers ; J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008855809