Central banker contracts, incomplete information, and monetary policy surprises : in search of a selfish central banker?
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chortareas, Georgios E. ; Miller, Stephen M. |
Published in: |
Public choice. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0048-5829, ZDB-ID 207597-0. - Vol. 116.2003, 3/4, p. 271-295
|
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Zentralbank | Central bank | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Theorie | Theory |
-
Credibility, transparency and asymmetric information in monetary policy
Hughes Hallett, Andrew, (2001)
-
Castellani-Debrun, Francesca, (2003)
-
Announcements, Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Incentives
Walsh, Carl E., (2003)
- More ...
-
Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets
Chortareas, Georgios E., (2000)
-
Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency
Chortareas, Georgios E., (2000)
-
Chortareas, Georgios E., (2002)
- More ...