Centralization or Decentralization in Multi-Agency Contracting Games?
Year of publication: |
2012-11
|
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Authors: | Chen, Yu |
Institutions: | Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research (CAEPR), Department of Economics |
Subject: | multi-agency | ex post equilibrium | mechanism design | menu design | revelation principle | delegation principle | relative information evaluation |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 2012-008 40 pages |
Classification: | C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: |
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Centralization or Decentralization in Multi-Agency Contracting Games?
Chen, Yu, (2012)
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Decentralizability of Multi-Agency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation
Chen, Yu, (2013)
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Decentralizability of Multi-Agency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation
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Decentralizability of Multi-Agency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation
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On the Characterization of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms in General Quasi-linear Environments
Chen, Yu, (2014)
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Decentralizability of Multi-Agency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation
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