Centralized Bargaining, Multi-Tasking, and Work Incentives.

The paper examines the implications of an important aspect of the ongoing reorganization of work - the move from occupational specialization toward multi-tasking - for centralized wage bargaining. The analysis shows how, on account of this reorganization, centralized bargaining becomes increasingly inefficient and detrimental to firms' profit opportunities, since it prevents firms from offering their employees adequate incentives to perform the appropirate mix of tasks.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Lindbeck, A ; Snower, D-J
Institutions:	Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), Stockholms Universitet
Subject:	BUSINESS ORGANIZATION \| EMPLOYMENT \| UNEMPLOYMENT \| BARGAINING \| WAGE DETERMINATION \| TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

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Series:	Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	34 pages
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; O3 - Technological Change; Research and Development ; E24 - Employment; Unemployment; Wages ; J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779996