CEO Career Concerns in Early Tenure and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reporting

The literature on CSR disclosure focuses on its economic consequences, but little is known about motivations, especially CEO personal incentives, behind such disclosure. Using an array of CSR reporting measures, we find that career concerns of CEOs early in their tenure motivate them to use voluntary CSR reporting as a signaling mechanism. The negative association between CEO tenure and CSR reporting is more pronounced in firms with stronger information intermediaries, i.e., a higher level of socially responsible investors, a higher number of analysts following, and a higher level of media coverage. We also find that CEOs early in their tenure receive more personal benefits after voluntary CSR reporting, in terms of higher total compensation, better reputation, and less turnover, than CEOs later in their tenure. Taken together, the findings of our study lend support to the conjecture that CEO career concerns in early tenure can be an important determinant of firms’ voluntary CSR reporting