CEO incentive contracts in China : why does city location matter?
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bryson, Alex ; Forth, John ; Zhou, Minghai |
Publisher: |
London : National Inst. of Economic and Social Research |
Subject: | Executive compensation | CEOs | privatisation | FDI | China | cities | Auslandsinvestition | Foreign investment | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Privatisierung | Privatization | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Wirkungsanalyse | Impact assessment | Öffentliches Unternehmen | Public enterprise | Betrieblicher Standort | Firm location | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Sonderwirtschaftszone | Special economic zone |
-
CEO incentive contracts in China : why does city location matter?
Bryson, Alex, (2013)
-
Chapter 2 CEO Incentive Contracts in China: Why Does City Location Matter?
Bryson, Alex, (2014)
-
CEO incentive contracts in China : why does city location matter?
Bryson, Alex, (2014)
- More ...
-
Who posts performance bonds and why?: evidence from China's CEOs
Bryson, Alex, (2014)
-
Same or different? the CEO labour market in China's public listed companies
Bryson, Alex, (2014)
-
CEO incentive contracts in China: why does city location matter?
Bryson, Alex, (2013)
- More ...