Challenging the Intrapersonal Empathy Gap An Experiment with Self-Commitment Power

Loewenstein (1996, 2005) identifies an intrapersonal empathy gap. In the respectiveexperiments, subjects make choices with delayed consequences. When enteringthe state where these consequences would unfold, they get the possibility to revisetheir initial choice. Revisions are more substantial when these two choices are madein different emotional states. The concept of the empathy gap suggests that theinitial choice represents a misprediction of future preferences. However, it mightalternatively be based on a well understood disagreement with future preferences.In this sense, people would like to add: “But don’t ask me again!” To disentangleboth explanations, we induce two different emotional states in each subject andoffer a self-commitment device in the first state. In one condition, subjects movefrom a “cold” state of reflection to a “hot” state of impulsiveness. In the othercondition, this order is reversed. We find evidence for the hot-to-cold empathy gap,but not for the cold-to-hot empathy gap when subjects can self-commit to theirinitial choice.