Changes in the incentive contracts of takeover targets after merger failures
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Li, Lin ; Tong, Wilson H. ; Cheng, Peter |
Subject: | corporate takeover | executive compensation | pay-performance sensitivity | severance contract | Übernahme | Takeover | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Fusion | Merger | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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