Chapter 12 Incentive models of the defense procurement process

Economic theorists have devoted considerable attention to analyzing models of closely related incentive contracting problems that arise in the study of public procurement, private procurement, regulation, the theory of the firm, the theory of organizations, and managerial compensation. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the incentive models literature as it applies to defense procurement.

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Year of publication:	1995
Authors:	Rogerson, William P.
Published in:	Handbook of defense economics : volume 1. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISBN 0-444-81887-1. - 1995, p. 309-346
Subject:	defense procurement \| contracts \| incentives \| principal agent models \| R&D \| economies of scale \| innovation \| moral hazard \| strategic behavior \| competition \| auctions \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Militärauftrag \| Military contract \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Öffentlicher Auftrag \| Public contract \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Skalenertrag \| Returns to scale

Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1016/S1574-0013(05)80014-6 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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