Chapter 2. Dynamic Security Design and Corporate Financing*
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sannikov, Yuliy |
Published in: |
Corporate finance. - Amsterdam : North-Holland, Elsevier, ISBN 0-444-53594-2. - 2013, p. 71-122
|
Subject: | Security design | Dynamic contracts | Moral hazard | Asymmetric information | Signaling | Incentives | Moral Hazard | Asymmetrische Information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Signalling | Unternehmensfinanzierung | Corporate finance |
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