Chapter 59 Self-centered Fairness in Games with More Than Two Players

The concept of self-centered fairness, as embodied in ERC preferences, organizes the data from the two-person ultimatum and dictator game, as well as the Gthvan Damme game, the market game, the dictator game with multiple recipients, and the fixed total sacrifice effect as observed in this chapter. An interesting theme for future empirical and theoretical research, particularly in games with more than two players, is the identification of the appropriate reference group. While this task is rather obvious in the simple games considered here, this need not to be true in more complex social environments. A nice example of an environment with competing reference groups can be found in European parliaments. The income distribution of the Europe-parliamentarians in Brussels is highly unequal. Due to the conflicting reference groups and given the differing incomes of the parliamentarians across nations, it is far from obvious what constitutes a fair income distribution within the European parliament.