Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: The fixed agenda framework
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Peris, Josep E. ; Sánchez, M.Carmen |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 8551017. - Vol. 18.2001, 1, p. 113-128
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