Characterization of strategy-proof, revenue monotone combinatorial auction mechanisms and connection with false-name-Proofness
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Todo, Taiki ; Iwasaki, Atsushi ; Yokoo, Makoto |
Published in: |
Internet and network economics : 5th international workshop, WINE 2009, Rome, Italy, December 14-18, 2009 ; proceedings. - Berlin : Springer, ISBN 3-642-10840-7. - 2009, p. 561-568
|
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Scheduling-Verfahren | Scheduling problem | Theorie | Theory |
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