Choice in insurance markets : a Pigouvian approach to social insurance design
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hendren, Nathaniel ; Landais, Camille ; Spinnewijn, Johannes |
Published in: |
Annual review of economics. - Palo Alto, Calif. : Annual Reviews, ISSN 1941-1391, ZDB-ID 2516757-1. - Vol. 13.2021, p. 457-486
|
Subject: | adverse selection | moral hazard | optimal mandate | Pigouvian subsidy | Theorie | Theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Sozialversicherung | Social insurance | Subvention | Subsidy | Versicherungsmarkt | Insurance market | Versicherungsökonomik | Economics of insurance |
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